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Abstract
In this paper, we take a first step toward exploring empirically the product
assortment strategies of oligopolistic firms. Our starting point is a discrete-
choice demand model for differentiated products. We incorporate the demand
model into an equilibrium supply model, in which firms compete by first choos-
ing which products to offer and then by setting prices. We show how modeling
joint product assortment and pricing decisions enriches standard product choice
models by allowing insights into how demand characteristics affect firms’ prod-
uct offerings in a competitive environment. We furthermore demonstrate that
incorporating endogenous product choice into demand models is essential for
policy simulations (e.g., mergers) as it entails at times dramatically different
welfare assessments than the common assumption that product assortments are
exogenous.
Keywords: product assortment decisions, multi-product firms, discrete games
JEL Classification: L0, L1, L2, L8, M3
1 Introduction
Decisions about product assortments and prices are among the most fundamental
choices firms have to make. When selecting which products to offer, a firm in a com-
petitive environment has to weigh the benefits of a “popular” product space location
against the potential downside of fiercer price competition. Ever since Hotelling’s
(1929) seminal paper, this fundamental tradeoff has been central to the literature.
Deciding how to weigh demand against competitive considerations also remains a
primary concern in applied contexts, with managers grappling over pricing and prod-
uct assortment decisions.
In determining equilibrium product assortments, assumptions about the behav-
ior of rivals and consumer preferences over product characteristics are crucial, in
particular in product categories with multidimensional product differentiation.1 De-
tailed modeling of demand and price competition is therefore of key importance in
empirically assessing the determinants of product choices. In this paper we develop
an integrated empirical framework that specifies consumer demand for differentiated
products while endogenizing the pricing and product-assortment decisions of compet-
ing firms. Our model allows us to separate demand, marginal cost, and fixed cost
contributions to profitability from alternative product offerings.
We demonstrate in a series of counterfactual experiments how changes in demand
or market structure affect equilibrium product assortments and prices. Considering
product choices as strategic variables to the firm when conducting policy analyses
yields different predictions from a simpler model that holds these fixed. We show,
for example, that a reduction in the number of competitors due to a merger may
be profitable for the merging firm, while at the same time benefiting consumers in
the form of higher product variety. To the extent that consumer surplus gains from
product variety outweigh losses from higher prices in the more concentrated market,
we illustrate that a merger may be unambiguously welfare enhancing, a prediction
which critically depends on the ability of firms to respond in their assortment choices
to the new market structure. These results complement recent theoretical work by
Gandhi, Froeb, Tschanz & Werden (2008) that finds the potential for substantial
differences in consumer welfare and profitability effects of a merger when allowing
1See for example Vandenbosch & Weinberg (1995), Economides (1986), and Neven & Thisse
(1990) for models of product competition with multiple vertical, horizontal, or both dimensions,
respectively, and Gabszewicz & Thisse (1992) for a survey of location models.
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post-merger product repositioning relative to a fixed product assortment.
The existing literature has made considerable progress in characterizing compe-
tition among heterogeneous firms by focusing on component parts of the product
assortment decisions with separate streams of research. Structural demand models
generate consistent estimates of price elasticities given the products that firms have
chosen to offer, but they assume that these products and their characteristics are ex-
ogenous and fixed (see e.g., Berry 1994, Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes 1995, Nevo 2000).
However, firms frequently adjust their product portfolios in response to changes in the
economic environment such as those caused by mergers. Similarly, a national manu-
facturer can easily adapt offerings in a given market to reflect changing local demo-
graphics, seasonal demand spikes, or changes in the local competitive environment.
Berry & Waldfogel (2001) and Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (2004) provide empirical
evidence of instances of product repositioning after consolidation or expansion in an
industry. The assumption of fixed product assortments may thus be problematic.
At the same time, there is growing literature on the supply side that endogenizes
product-choice decisions for heterogeneous competitors, emphasizing the strategic as-
pects of product choice (Mazzeo 2002, Einav 2003, Seim 2006). These models focus
on explaining entry and location decisions in situations where prices are not a choice
variable of the firm or use a reduced-form profit function that does not explicitly
incorporate the prices and quantities of the products offered. Firms’ product-space
locations and those of their competitors are the sole arguments of the firms’ objective
function, thereby also limiting the scope of counterfactual exercises one can conduct
using the estimated parameters. Without an explicit model of demand and post-entry
product market competition, for example, we cannot make inferences about equilib-
rium prices after a product portfolio change, e.g., due to a merger. An early attempt
to tackle this issue is Reiss & Spiller (1989), albeit in the context of symmetric firms
offering one of two products. Thomadsen (2007) uses estimated demand systems
to conduct counterfactual analyses of location competition between single-outlet re-
tailers. His work does not attempt to directly exploit the information entailed in
firms’ location choices to infer fixed cost determinants of entry decisions, but instead
highlights the role of travel costs in determining equilibrium choices in simulations.
The entry literature typically relies on information contained in discrete firm de-
cisions to infer bounds on profitability that would be consistent with the observed
behavior, whereby, for example, the fact that a firm operates in a particular market
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allows the inference that it is more profitable to operate in that location than to exit.
The coarseness of these discrete data make it difficult to base the profit function on all
but the simplest of demand structures, ones which generally do not represent product-
market competition in oligopolistic industries with differentiated products well. As a
result, the majority of the literature focuses on relatively homogeneous competitors,
such as single-outlet retail stores in well-delimited, small markets. For frequently
purchased products that differ in attributes, quality, and brand value, the interplay
between consumer preferences for product attributes and their price sensitivities is
arguably more central to the product offering decision than similar considerations
would be in the context of, say, store location choices. For this reason we start with
a discrete-choice demand model for differentiated products and from it develop an
equilibrium model of joint product assortment and pricing decisions. The availability
of richer data, in particular data on prices and quantities, allows us to better separate
the strategic considerations in product assortment decisions of interest from market
heterogeneity that drives consumer demand and marginal costs.
We estimate our empirical model of price and product selection by multi-product
firms using data on supermarket ice cream sales to illustrate the empirical implemen-
tation. Industry analysts and regulators frequently discuss the interaction between
flavor selection and pricing in shaping the competitive environment of ice cream mar-
kets. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently sought a preliminary in-
junction to block a proposed merger between two competing ice cream manufacturers
on the grounds that it would “. . . lead to anticompetitive effects . . . including less
product variety and higher prices.”2
We focus on two national manufacturers - Breyers and Dreyers - that meet in 64
separate regional markets. Since our data is aggregated across stores in a market area,
we consider the manufacturers’ product-choice decisions of which flavors to offer at the
market level abstracting from the manufacturer-retailer interaction. The institutional
realities in the ice cream industry suggest that manufacturers have substantial control
over the varieties placed in the supermarkets. Ice cream is not handled through
supermarket warehouses but through a direct-to-store distribution network.3 Ice-
2Information from the FTC website at www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/03/dreyers.htm. Note that the
FTC’s concerns related primarily to Dreyers’ super-premium brands (Dreamery, Godiva and Star-
bucks).
3It is delivered by partners of Breyers (an independent broker network) and by Dreyers’ in-house
distribution arm.
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cream manufacturers “rent” freezer space in the stores and retain full responsibility
for what to stock.
We model the possible offerings in the “vanilla” subcategory, which is by far the
most frequently purchased flavor, accounting for more than one quarter of all sales.
Interestingly, in recent years there has been a number of new product introductions in
this space - Breyers and Dreyers now offer up to six varieties of vanilla. The size and
evolution of the product category suggests that choices among vanillas are important
in their own right, while also being representative of flavor offering decisions across
the entire product assortment for these brands.
We consider a two-stage setup where firms initially make their assortment deci-
sions in a discrete game that draws on their variable profits derived in the subsequent
stage of price competition. In our set-up, firms have at their disposal a set of pre-
viously developed flavors from which they choose a subset of offerings depending on
local product market and competitive conditions. We assume that competing firms
have incomplete information about each others’ profitability of offering particular
assortments. This assumption allows us to avoid comparing all possible product con-
figurations for all firms to ensure that no profitable unilateral deviation exists, which is
necessary to compute the equilibrium in a complete information setting (Seim 2006).
Instead, we derive the Bayesian Nash equilibrium conjectures - a computationally
much easier task (Rust 1994). As such, the observed product offerings are optimal
ex ante - if others had been chosen, the resulting price and quantity outcomes would
have yielded lower profits for the market participants. The sequential structure of the
game where firms choose prices after observing their competitors’ first-stage assort-
ment choices allows us to separately identify demand and marginal cost parameters
from other determinants of the assortment decisions.
In summary, this paper makes three contributions. We extend prior research
(Kekre & Srinivasan 1990, Bayus & Putsis 1999, Draganska & Jain 2005) on product-
line length by considering not only how many, but also which of the vanilla varieties to
offer. We show how data on prices and quantities can enrich the insights obtained from
traditional location choice or entry models. Last, we demonstrate how incorporating
endogenous product choice is essential for policy simulations and may entail very
different conclusions from settings where product assortment choices are held fixed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop
the modeling framework. Section 3 describes the ice cream market and the data we
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use for the empirical analysis. We outline our estimation approach in Section 4 and
then discuss the estimation results and a number of counterfactual analyses that the
proposed modeling framework allows us to conduct in Section 5. Section 6 concludes
with directions for future research.
2 Model
A total of b = 1, . . . , B firms (brands)4 decide which flavors to offer in a given market
and how to price them given their expectation of their competitors’ offerings, demand,
and a fixed cost of offering each subset of flavors.
In the first stage, the firms decide which flavors to offer. Each firm starts with
a predetermined set of potential flavors to offer and selects the optimal subset of
flavors among this potential set. In the second stage, firms observe each others’ flavor
choices. Conditional on their own and their competitors’ choice of offerings, firms
choose prices.
Clearly, firms do not revise offerings for all potential flavors in each period and
market. There are certain flavors that a brand always offers. We call them staples.
The assortment decisions being made concern only what we refer to as the optional
flavors. The flavor choice model can be thus thought of applying to optional flavors
of a brand that are not offered in all of the markets, as opposed to the staple flavors
of a brand.5 While we abstract from the product offering decision for staple flavors,
our model takes into account the demand for staples in determining the price for all
flavors in the market.
More formally, brand b has flavors f = 1, 2, . . . , Ob, Ob + 1, Ob + 2, . . . , Fb at its
disposal. The optional flavors are 1, . . . , Ob; flavors Ob + 1, . . . , Fb are the staples
that the firm always offers. Note that the optional and staple flavors may differ
from brand to brand. Define the vector dbt = (db1t, . . . , dbObt) ∈ {0, 1}Ob , where dbft
indicates whether optional flavor f is offered by competitor b in market t.
4In the remainder of the paper we use firms and brands interchangeably.
5The loss of information is not severe because all we can learn from the fact that a brand always
offers a particular flavor is that the cost of offering that flavor is smaller than the lowest incremental
variable profit across periods from offering it, which would only yield an upper bound on such costs.
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2.1 Stage 2
In the second stage, we solve for equilibrium prices for every possible combination of
flavor choices. These prices then flow back into the first stage to determine profits
for each of the flavors that a firm is considering.
Consumer demand. We assume a discrete choice model of demand. Let Ubfkt
denote consumer k’s utility for brand b’s flavor f in market/period t. We specify
Ubfkt = Xbftβk − αkpbt + ²bfkt = δbft + µbfkt + ²bfkt (1)
where δbft is the mean utility across consumers. We allow for consumer heterogeneity
through µbfkt, a deviation from mean utility. In the above specification of utility,
Xbft denotes observed characteristics of the flavor, such as firm and/or flavor fixed
effects, whether the flavor is featured in the store ads or on display in the store in a
given market. pbt denotes the price charged by firm b in market t. Note that prices
for all flavors within a brand are the same as is typical in product categories such
as ice cream (Shankar & Bolton 2004, Draganska & Jain 2006). We assume that
the random component of utility, ²bfkt, is distributed according to an extreme value
distribution. It is known to the consumer, but observed by the firms or the researcher
only in distribution.
Let the distribution of µbfkt across consumers be denoted as H(µ). We integrate
the consumer-level probabilities to derive an offered flavor’s aggregate market share
across all consumers:
sbft(p1t, . . . , pBt; d1t, . . . , dBt)
=
∫
eδbft+µbfkt
eδ00t +
∑
b′
∑Ob′
f ′=1 db′f ′te
δb′f ′t+µb′f ′kt +
∑
b′
∑Fb′
f ′=Ob′+1
eδb′f ′t+µb′f ′kt
dH(µ).(2)
Market shares depend on prices p1t, . . . , pBt as well as flavor offerings d1t, . . . , dBt. We
allow the mean utility for the outside good, δ00t, to vary with market demographics
and seasonal effects.
Demand models of this type typically incorporate unobserved (to the researcher)
product attributes in consumer utility that are a potential source of price endogeneity
(Berry 1994, Berry et al. 1995). These unobserved product characteristics may be
constant over time such as brand quality perceptions or they may vary over time like
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shelf-space allocation (Villas-Boas & Winer 1999). While we can infer market/time-
specific unobservable attributes associated with product assortment that have been
chosen, inferring the value of the unobservables for non-offered products is infeasible
without imposing additional (strong) assumptions. For example, if we assumed that
firms only observe the demand shocks at the time of their pricing, but not at the time
of their assortment decision, then firms would need to form expectations over them in
choosing offerings. However, as will become clearer when we present the supply model
below, a flavor’s variable profit is a highly nonlinear function of the unobservables, so
taking this expectation is a nontrivial exercise. In particular, we would need to make
some distributional assumption for the unobservables, thus implying that we know
the distribution of the equilibrium prices (see Berry (1994) for an explanation of why
this type of assumption is inconsistent with the equilibrium model). Our solution
to this problem is pragmatic: We assume that in our empirical setting the brand-
flavor-specific constants in the demand system along with the market characteristics
and time effects capture most of the unobserved determinants of brand-flavor shares
across markets.
Firm profits. For a set of flavors determined in the first stage, firm b chooses
prices to maximize expected profit. Firms are assumed to compete in Bertrand-Nash
fashion, given their cost structures.
Firm b incurs a marginal cost of cbt for each unit offered in market t. The marginal
costs of offering a flavor include costs for ingredients such as milk, cream, sugar,
and flavorings and costs of packaging, labeling, and distributing the product. We
specify them as cbt =
∑
k wbktγ + ηbt, where wbt are brand-specific cost shifters k and
ηbt is a brand-specific component of marginal cost.
6 We assume that firms observe
each other’s marginal costs when they choose prices, i.e., marginal costs are public
information.
We follow the literature in allowing part of the marginal costs to be unobservable
to the researcher (Berry et al. 2004). Similar to the demand-side problem of account-
ing for unobserved product characteristics for absent flavors, we have to confront the
problem that we do not observe the value of the unobservable marginal cost com-
ponents for a brand-flavor combination that is not offered. We solve this problem
6While our model readily accommodates cost shifters that are brand-flavor specific, our applica-
tion to ice cream does not require this additional generality, see Section 4.1 for details.
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by assuming that the unobservable component of marginal cost varies by time and
brand but not by flavor. Assuming that firms set their prices optimally (conditional
on the chosen assortment), we can then recover the value of this unobservable from
the pricing first-order conditions and use it to estimate the firm’s marginal cost of
flavors that it ultimately does not include in its assortment.
In addition, we assume firm b has a fixed cost to offer flavor f in each market t,
νbft, distributed according to probability distribution function Gbf that differs across
brands and flavors. The fixed costs of offering a flavor includes the operating costs of
producing the flavor (foregone economies of scale due to smaller batches, cost of clean-
ing machines, labeling, etc.), the distribution costs of getting the flavor to customers
(such as additional inventory and stocking costs that likely increase in the number
of flavors offered), advertising costs associated with promoting the flavor (which may
vary on a flavor-by-flavor basis depending on the offerings of the local competition).
Other fixed costs relate to slotting fees paid by manufacturers to retailers. These are
substantial in the ice cream category and, according to a recent investigation by the
FTC, generally vary region-by-region and across brands and flavor offerings for any
given retailer. When a manufacturer offers an additional flavor, the retailer adjusts
its slotting fees to reflect opportunity costs that are significant in the frozen food area
of the supermarket, where shelf space is scarce. Such opportunity costs vary over time
within a market, reflecting variation in such opportunity costs due to, for example,
product introductions in the broader ice cream or other frozen foods categories or
growth of a particular frozen food category.
We assume furthermore that this fixed cost is only observed by the firm itself, but
not by its competitors, i.e., it is private information. In contrast to marginal costs,
which are primarily driven by observable costs for homogeneous inputs, fixed costs
may depend on the efficiency of each firm’s processes, proprietary strategic decision
they have made, or specific agreements between the firm and its retailers over slotting
fees, the terms of which are generally private information between the parties to the
agreement.
If a firm decides to offer more than one optional flavor, we assume that its total
fixed costs are the sum of the individual fixed costs. This additive formulation allows
us to handle multi-product firms without adding too much complexity. The drawback
is that we rule out economies of scope, i.e., the fixed cost of adding a particular flavor
does not change with the products that are already being offered.
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Firm b’s objective is to maximize the profit from the staples and the optional
flavors that it offers (as indicated by dbt = (db1t, . . . , dbObt)):
max
pbt
(pbt − cbt)M
(
Ob∑
f=1
sbft(·)dbft +
Fb∑
f=Ob+1
sbft(·)
)
−
Ob∑
f=1
νbftdbft, (3)
whereM is the size of the market. To simplify the notation, we suppress (p1t, . . . , pBt;
d1t, . . . , dbt) as arguments of sbft.
Differentiating yields the competitors’ first-order conditions with respect to prices:
pbt(d1t, . . . , dBt) = cbt −
∑Ob
f=1 sbft(·)dbft +
∑Fb
f=Ob+1
sbft(·)∑Ob
f=1
∂sbft(·)
∂pbt
dbft +
∑Fb
f=Ob+1
∂sbft(·)
∂pbt
. (4)
Solving the system of equations (4) yields equilibrium prices for the specific flavor
offerings considered. Because we are dealing with multi-product firms, the conditions
for uniqueness outlined in Caplin & Nalebuff (1991) do not necessarily hold.
We emphasize the dependency of prices on flavor offerings by writing pbt(d1t, . . . , dBt)
for equilibrium prices. We solve for equilibrium prices for the remaining possible fla-
vor sets analogously. This gives us a vector of 2
∑
bOb different prices for firm b,
one for each possible bundle of flavors that could be offered. We let sbt denote
brand b’s aggregate market share at time t as a function of its and its competi-
tors’ flavor offerings, sbt =
(∑Ob
f=1 sbft(dbt, d−bt)dbft +
∑Fb
f=Ob+1
sbft(dbt, d−bt)
)
, where
d−bt = (d1t, . . . , db−1t, db+1t, . . . , dBt) are the flavor offerings of all brands but b.
2.2 Stage 1
Each firm chooses the optimal set of flavors given its expectation of the other firms’
choices and prices under each configuration. Firm b chooses dbt = (db1t, . . . , dbObt) to
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maximize expected profits given by:
E [Πbt(dbt, d−bt)]
= E
[
(pbt(dbt, d−bt)− cbt)Msbt(dbt, d−bt)−
Ob∑
f=1
νbftdbft
]
=
∑
d−bt
(
(pbt(dbt, d−bt)− cbt)Msbt(dbt, d−bt)
)
Pr(d−bt)−
Ob∑
f=1
νbftdbft
= Πbt(dbt)−
Ob∑
f=1
νbftdbft. (5)
The first part of the expression is the expected variable profit and the second repre-
sents the fixed costs. Since firm b does not know the fixed costs of its rivals, it cannot
predict their flavor offerings with certainty. Hence, firm b forms expectations over its
rivals’ flavor offerings. In particular, Pr(d−bt) is the joint probability that its rivals
offer the particular subset of flavors in d−bt.
The marginal probability that firm b offers bundle dbt is:
Pr(dbt) = Pr
(
E [Πbt(dbt, d−bt) ≥ E [Πbt(d′bt, d−bt)] ∀d′bt ∈ {0, 1}Ob
)
=
∫
A(dbt)
Ob∏
f=1
dGbf (νbft), (6)
where we let A(dbt) denote the set of values for νbt = (νb1t, . . . , νbObt) that induce the
choice of flavor bundle dbt:
A(dbt) =
{
νbt
∣∣∣∣∣Πbt(dbt)− Πbt(d′bt) ≥
Ob∑
f=1
νbft(dbft − d′bft) ∀d′bt ∈ {0, 1}Ob
}
. (7)
Assuming independence across firm cost shocks, νbft, entails that the joint prob-
ability of observing a particular set of product offerings in the market (d1t, . . . , dBt)
is the product of the marginal probabilities for dbt defined in equation (6). Substi-
tuting the flavor choice probabilities defined above into each firm’s expected profit
yields a measure of the attractiveness of each choice as a function of the competitors’
probabilistic choices. The probability that firm b chooses flavor offering dbt is then
the probability that the expected profit of offering dbt exceeds expected profits of any
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other flavor offering d′bt, given its conjecture of its competitors’ behavior.
The expressions defined in equations (5) and (6) characterize a system of
∑B
b=1 2
Ob
equations in
∑B
b=1 2
Ob unknown flavor choice conjectures. We solve for each firm’s
probability of offering a given product assortment by numerically integrating over its
unobserved fixed cost νbt, as a function of its competitors’ assortment choice proba-
bilities. The equilibrium probabilities of offering each flavor combination are found
by searching for the fixed point of the system of equations for all competitors, the
solution to which are the
∑B
b=1 2
Ob flavor offering probabilities. We solve the sys-
tem of equations defined in equation (6) with a nonlinear equation solver, which is
a more reliable, faster solution mechanism than commonly used iterative fixed point
algorithms that may not be able to reach certain solutions of the system of equa-
tions. The resulting fixed point in flavor offering probabilities is the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium for the system of best response functions.
One difficulty in estimating discrete games is the possibility of a multiplicity of
equilibrium assortment choices.7 The literature has addressed this problem in a num-
ber of ways. Uniqueness generally ensues if one is willing to impose that the players
make their assortment decisions sequentially in Stackelberg fashion. This assumption
is difficult to justify in our environment both because of the frequent decision-making
and the relative symmetry of the two companies in our context. Alternative two-
step estimators that initially predict which equilibrium is chosen before computing
profits (Bajari, Hong, Krainer & Nekipelov 2006) are difficult to implement for lack
of exogenous shifters of each firm’s equilibrium selection mechanism. Instead as in
Orhun (2006), Seim (2006) and Zhu & Singh (2006), we investigate the prevalence of
multiple equilibria in our context numerically, by computing the number of assort-
ment equilibria that arise for each of a set of grid points that span a large part of the
parameter space. At the estimated parameters, we find that there is always a unique
equilibrium.
Two-firm-two-flavor example. As an illustration of the expected profit function
and flavor choice conjectures, consider a two-firm problem (B = 2) where each firm
has a choice of two optional flavors to offer (O1 = O2 = 2). To focus on the flavor
choice stage, we restrict our attention to optional flavors only (F1 = O1;F2 = O2).
7Recall from Section 2.1 that in our multi-product firm setting we also may have multiple equi-
libria of the pricing game.
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Figure 1: Expected profits.
Each firm then chooses to offer that set of flavors that maximizes expected profit
in a given market. With two flavors, there are four possible choices, offering either,
both, or none of the flavors, i.e., we have db = (db1, db2) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}.
The firms thus compare four expected profit levels and choose the flavor(s) that
corresponds to the highest level of expected profit. Figure 1 illustrates the example.
Suppressing market subscripts for ease of readability, firm 1’s expected profit if it
chooses flavor 1, or d1 = (1, 0), is given by:
E [Π1(1, 0, d21, d22)] = E [(p1(1, 0, d21, d22)− c1)Ms11(1, 0, d21, d22)]− ν11. (8)
Since firm 1 does not observe firm 2’s fixed cost, it has to form an expectation of firm
2’s optimal flavor choice, that is, a probability assessment of how likely it is that firm
2 chooses any one of its four possible flavor sets. Integrating over firm 2’s cost type
yields expected profit of the form:
E [Π1(1, 0, d21, d22)]
=
∑
d21,d22∈{0,1}
(
p1(1, 0, d21, d22)− c1
)
Ms11(1, 0, d21, d22) Pr(d21, d22)− ν11
= Π1(1, 0)− ν11, (9)
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where p1(1, 0, d21, d22) denotes firm 1’s optimal price as determined in stage 2 if it
offered flavor 1 and firm 2 offers the flavor set d2 = (d21, d22), while Pr(d21, d22) denotes
the probability that firm 2 offers that flavor set. The flavor offering considered by
firm 1 and the possible flavors offered by firm 2 are thus reflected in both the price
firm 1 charges and its expected market share. Firm 1’s expected profit for flavor
2 is computed similarly. As in the entry literature (Bresnahan & Reiss (1991)),
we normalize the expected profit from not offering any flavor to zero, yielding the
traditional profit threshold crossing condition for offering a flavor.
The expected profit if firm 1 offers both flavors, i.e., chooses flavor set d1 = (1, 1),
is given by:
E [Π1(1, 1, d21, d22)]
=
∑
d21,d22∈{0,1}
(
p1(1, 1, d21, d22)− c1
)
M(
s11(1, 1, d21, d22) + s12(1, 1, d21, d22)
)
Pr(d21, d22)− (ν11 + ν12)
= Π(1, 1)− (ν11 + ν12). (10)
Firm 2’s expected profits are derived analogously.
Each firm’s expected profit depends on its assessment of how likely it is that its
competitor offers each of its possible flavors and flavor combinations. Four flavor
choice conjectures need to be formed: firm 1’s assessment of firm’s 2 probability of
not offering any flavor, offering flavor 1, offering flavor 2, and offering both flavors.
Firm 1’s assessment of firm 2’s probability of offering flavor 1 is given by:
Pr(d2 = (1, 0))
= Pr
(
E [Π2(d11, d12, 1, 0)] > E [Π2(d11, d12, 1, 1)] ∧ E [Π2(d11, d12, 1, 0)] > 0
∧E [Π2(d11, d12, 1, 0)] > E [Π2(d11, d12, 0, 1)]
)
= Pr
(
− ν22 < Π2(1, 0)− Π2(1, 1) ∧ ν21 < Π2(1, 0)
∧ν21 − ν22 < Π2(1, 0)− Π2(0, 1)
)
. (11)
Let the distributions of ν21 and ν22 be G21 and G22 with corresponding densities g21
and g22 and denote Π2(1, 0) − Π2(0, 1) as a, Π2(1, 0) as b, and Π2(1, 0) − Π2(1, 1) as
13
c. The probability of offering flavor 1 is thus
Pr(d2 = (1, 0)) = Pr(−ν22 < c, ν21 < b, ν21 − ν22 < a), (12)
which in ν21 × ν22 space in Figure 2 is the area left of b and above −c minus the
triangle spanned by (b,−c), (a− c,−c), and (b, b− a). Hence,
Pr(d2 = (1, 0))
= G21(b)(1−G22(−c))−
∫ b
ν21=a−c
∫ ν21−a
ν22=−c
g22(ν22)dν22g21(ν21)dν21
= G21(b)(1−G22(−c))−
∫ b
ν21=a−c
(G22(ν21 − a)−G22(−c))g21(ν21)dν21
= G21(b)(1−G22(−c)) +G22(−c)(G21(b)−G21(a− c))
+
∫ b
ν21=a−c
G22(ν21 − a)g21(ν21)dν21. (13)
The above presumes b ≥ a− c. If b < a− c, then the probability simplifies to:
Pr(−ν22 < c, ν21 < b, ν21 − ν22 < a) = G21(b)(1−G22(−c)).
Depending on the distribution assumed for G21 and G22, a closed-form solution for
these probability expressions may not exist. However, one can easily find the proba-
bilities using numerical integration techniques.
The probability that flavor 2 is chosen over no flavor, flavor 1, or flavors 1 and 2
together is obtained analogously as:
Pr(d2 = (0, 1)) = Pr(E [Π2(d11, d12, 0, 1)] > E [Π2(d11, d12, 1, 1)]
∧E [Π2(d11, d12, 0, 1)] > 0
∧E [Π2(d11, d12, 0, 1)] > E [Π2(d11, d12, 1, 0)])
= Pr
[
− ν21 < Π2(0, 1)− Π2(1, 1) ∧ ν22 < Π2(0, 1)
∧ν22 − ν21 < Π2(0, 1)− Π2(1, 0)
]
. (14)
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Figure 2: Regions of integration and product offerings.
The probability that firm 2 offers both flavors, flavors 1 and 2, is given by:
Pr(d2 = (1, 1)) = Pr
(
E [Π2(d11, d12, 1, 1)] > E [Π2(d11, d12, 1, 0)]
∧E [Π2(d11, d12, 1, 1)] > E [Π2(d11, d12, 0, 1)]
∧E [Π2(d11, d12, 1, 1)] > 0
)
= Pr(ν22 < Π2(1, 1)− Π2(1, 0) ∧ ν21 < Π2(1, 1)− Π2(0, 1)
∧ν21 + ν22 < Π2(1, 1)), (15)
while the probability that firm 2 chooses not to offer any flavors equals
Pr(d2 = (0, 0)) = Pr
(
E [Π2(d11, d12, 1, 0)] < 0 ∧ E [Π2(d11, d12, 0, 1)] < 0
∧E [Π2(d11, d12, 1, 1)] < 0
)
= Pr(ν21 > Π2(1, 0) ∧ ν22 > Π2(0, 1) ∧ ν21 + ν22 > Π2(1, 1)),(16)
which can be found similarly to the other probabilities.
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Equations (11), (14) – (16) together with their analogues for firm 2’s assessment
of firm 1’s probabilities form a system of 8 equations in the 8 unknown equilibrium
probabilities.
The two-by-two model illustrates the computational demands of solving and es-
timating the model. In particular, the number of profit scenarios that have to be
computed and the dimension of the fixed point go up exponentially in number of
flavors. In the above example with O1 = O2 = 2, there are 2
4 = 16 scenarios for
profits. Each firm has 22 = 4 possible assortments. If we added one more flavor, say,
O1 = 3 and O2 = 2, then there would already be 2
5 = 32 scenarios for profits, so
there is exponential growth. Firm 1 now has 23 = 8 possible assortments and firm
2 has 22 = 4 possible assortments, so the fixed-point problem we have to solve also
grows exponentially in the number of flavors.
3 Data
The main data for our analysis were collected by Information Resources, Inc. (IRI)
and cover 64 geographic markets across the U.S. for a period of 104 weeks from
September 2003 to September 2005. We have weekly information on the units of
ice cream sold, dollar sales, and percentage of sales sold on promotion for all UPCs
in the markets. While retail prices and promotions may vary weekly, manufacturer
decisions are made at a lower frequency. We are interested in the strategic decisions
of manufacturers and therefore conduct the empirical analysis at the monthly level.
Aggregating the data leaves us with 1600 observations (25 months, 64 markets) for
each UPC.
We declare a product available in a given market and period if there are nonzero
sales for this particular brand-flavor combination. Thus, another compelling reason to
aggregate to the monthly level is to avoid situations where a particular brand/flavor
is on some store shelves, but does not record any sales over a short period of time. In
constructing the monthly sample, we verified that we did not lose important weekly
variation in flavor availability. We computed for each of the optional flavors the
number of weeks in the month that the product was available in a particular market.
In approximately 97 percent of the market-month observations, the flavor appeared
in the data in either all or none of the weeks in that month. For the remaining three
percent of market-month observations, we assume that the flavor is available, even
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Figure 3: Dollar shares of ice creams by fat content, sugar content, and package size.
though it appears in the data in only three weeks (1.3% of the data), two weeks
(0.8%), or one week (0.9%) in that month. Treating the flavor as unavailable in these
instances did not change the empirical findings.
Ice cream is one of the most popular categories in supermarkets: 92.9% of house-
holds in the United States purchase in the category (IRI Marketing Factbook, 1993).
In the general category of ice cream, there is a distinction between ice cream, frozen
yogurt, sherbet and sorbet. Depending on butterfat content, ice cream is further dis-
aggregated into superpremium, premium, and economy categories. While a half-cup
serving of Ha¨agen Dazs Vanilla Bean ice cream, a superpremium flavor, has 18 grams
of fat and 290 calories, the equivalent serving of Dreyers, a premium brand, has only
8 grams of fat and 140 calories. Furthermore, ice cream is offered in a multitude of
package sizes, fat and sugar content levels. Figure 3 presents an overview.
Regular fat ice cream accounts for 86% of ice cream sales, and only 7.5% of all ice
cream sold has reduced or no sugar content. The most popular size is 4 pints with
about 48% of all sales, followed by the closely related 3.5 pint size with 29%,8 and 1
8Some brands, like Breyers, replaced their 4 pint packages with 3.5 pint ones without changing
the unit price. This strategy of increasing the per-ounce price is fairly common among manufacturers
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pint with 15%. Most of the superpremium ice cream brands such as Ben & Jerry’s
and Ha¨agen Dazs are sold almost exclusively in the smaller, 1 pint tubs, whereas the
other brands are usually sold in larger sizes.
To illustrate the model developed in this paper, we focus our attention on non-diet
ice cream (i.e., full fat and regular sugar) in the premium category, and in particular
on the decisions of the two leading national brands – Breyers and Dreyers – pertaining
to their assortment of vanilla flavors in the most popular family size of 3.5/4 pints.
Vanilla flavors represent up to one-third of total category sales. Our data reveal a
total of 22 different varieties of vanilla ice cream, involving subtle differences in the
ingredients. For example, Vanilla Bean flavors contain visible specks of vanilla, while
French Vanillas have a higher egg content. The most popular vanilla varieties in the
data are “French Vanilla,” “Vanilla,” “Vanilla Bean,” “Natural Vanilla,” and “Extra
Creamy Vanilla.” We do not include flavors with substantial additional ingredients
or flavorings, such as Cherry Vanilla or Vanilla Fudge. Because manufacturers do
not “specialize” in vanilla, but the number of vanilla flavors is highly correlated with
the total number of flavors offered, an analysis of the vanilla market should shed
considerable light on the firms’ product assortment decisions in general.
Table 1 presents a market structure snapshot across the 64 geographic regions in
our data set. For the purposes of this analysis, we have classified brands that do
not have at least five percent market share in at least five percent of the markets
(i.e., three markets) as “other.” For each brand, the table presents the number of
markets out of 64 for which the brand has each particular market share position.
Note that the entries for “Private label” and “Other” in Table 1 are aggregates of all
the private label (other brands) that are available in different regions and in different
stores within a region. Hence, their competitive position is overstated.9
Breyers and Dreyers10 are the only premium brands that are truly national and
have a presence in all markets. However, given the production requirements and
distribution economics associated with ice cream, many regional manufacturers es-
tablished in the early and middle parts of the 20th century have maintained their
of frequently purchased consumer packaged goods because it is not as obvious to consumers as a
change in the unit price.
9Because it is difficult to determine how their flavors map to the other brands’ vanilla offerings
based on the names, we include the private label and other brands in the outside good.
10Dreyer’s ice cream is sold under the brand name Edy’s in the Midwestern and Eastern United
States after Kraft (the makers of Breyers) raised objections in 1985.
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Table 1: Market share rank of manufacturers. across the 64 regional ice cream mar-
kets.
Number of Markets
Market Share Rank: 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th-
10th
Total
Breyers 14 21 23 5 1 64
Dreyers 5 11 14 20 14 64
Deans 0 0 0 1 10 11
Friendly 1 0 3 0 11 15
Hiland 0 2 0 0 5 7
Hood 1 2 0 2 3 8
Kemps 1 1 0 0 8 10
Mayfield 1 1 2 2 6 12
Pet 0 0 2 4 5 11
Prairie Farms 1 0 1 0 10 12
Tillamook 0 1 0 2 0 3
Turkey Hill 1 1 1 1 10 14
United Dairy 0 1 1 1 7 10
Wells Blue Bunny 3 0 4 6 15 28
Yarnells 1 0 0 2 2 5
Private Label 30 15 10 5 4 64
Other 5 8 3 13 32 61
market position through the present. Brands such as Hood in the Northeast, Blue
Bunny in the Midwest and the Southeast, and Tillamook in the Pacific Northwest
have substantial sales; indeed, they are holding the top share in several markets. In
addition, sales of private label brands vary in importance from one region to the next.
The data in Table 1 suggest that Breyers and Dreyers face very different competitive
conditions across the various geographic markets in which they compete.
Table 2 focuses on the vanilla flavors offered by the regional manufacturers, list-
ing the number of vanilla flavors offered by each across the geographic markets and
over the 25 months in our sample period. The first column in Table 2 reports the
maximum number of market-month observations, obtained by multiplying the num-
ber of geographic markets in which the regional brand has a presence by the number
of months. Columns two and three indicate the maximum number of flavors that a
brand ever offers in our sample period and the number of markets in which the brand
is ever present, respectively. With the exception of Kemps and Hiland, the regional
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players tend to offer fewer vanillas than Breyers and Dreyers. The remaining columns
in the table report how frequently the brands carry a full assortment (or a subset)
of their available flavors. Most of the regional brands exhibit relatively little variety
in their product assortments across markets and over time - for ten of the thirteen
brands, the modal number of flavors offered in the data occurs more than two-thirds
of the time. We use this evidence to support our assumption that the regional brands
do not act strategically with respect to product portfolio choice, and that the national
players compete market-by-market taking the flavors offered by regional competitors
to be exogenous. As such, this assumption provides an additional source of exogenous
variation that can be helpful in identification of the model parameters.
Importantly, there is variation in the availability of some of the vanilla flavors
for Breyers and Dreyers across geographic regions and months. Table 3 provides the
details. Natural Vanilla, French Vanilla and Extra Creamy Vanilla for Breyers and
Vanilla, French Vanilla and Vanilla Bean for Dreyers are (almost) always available
and can thus be treated as staples. Breyers Homemade Vanilla and Dreyers Natural
Vanilla, Double Vanilla and Vanilla Custard are the optional flavors, whose offering
varies widely by markets and periods. Double Vanilla was introduced towards the
end of our sample period, so it is a somewhat special case. Since we do not model the
nationwide rollout of a new product, we drop it from the product-choice analysis. We
also drop Breyers Vanilla because it only appears in two markets and a few months.
Table 4 illustrates the distribution of the market shares of Breyers and Dreyers’
vanilla flavors conditional on them being offered, along with the percentage of market-
months in which they are offered. Given that all flavors have the same price and
marginal cost of production, the market share of a flavor is indicative of its profitabil-
ity (prior to fixed costs) within the brand. A comparison of average market shares
and availabilities shows that more profitable flavors tend to be offered more often.
The correlation between average market share and the percentage of months offered is
0.5619. Among optional flavors, Dreyers Vanilla Custard has the lowest market share
(0.0078) and is offered the least frequently (43.40%) while Breyers Homemade Vanilla
has the highest market share (0.00344) and is offered the most frequently (86.50%).
These correlations, albeit based on small samples of flavors, provide some evidence
that the role of unobserved demand shocks that affect both the availability and the
market share of a flavor is limited in our application. Such demand shocks could
result in a negative correlation between shares and availabilities due to rarely offered
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Table 3: Percentage of months in which a flavor is avail-
able in a geographic market.
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Market V
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Albany, NY 0 100 100 96 100 100 100 0 27 100 0
Atlanta, GA 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 65 27 100 65
Baltimore/Washington 4 100 100 100 100 100 100 88 27 100 42
Birmingham/Montgom 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 50 27 100 38
Boise, ID 0 100 100 54 100 100 100 50 19 100 31
Boston, MA 0 100 100 65 100 100 100 0 27 100 0
Buffalo/Rochester 0 100 100 96 100 100 100 50 27 100 0
Charlotte, NC 0 100 100 100 100 54 100 73 27 100 77
Chicago, IL 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 77 31 100 35
Cincinnati/Dayton 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 65 27 100 23
Cleveland, OH 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 73 23 100 42
Columbus, OH 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 50 23 100 88
Dallas/Ft Worth 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 27 100 88
Denver, CO 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 88 27 100 92
Des Moines, IA 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 54 27 100 23
Detroit, MI 15 100 100 100 100 100 100 42 23 100 38
Grand Rapids, MI 0 100 100 0 100 100 100 35 23 100 12
Green Bay, WI 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 81 27 100 50
Harrisburg/Scranton 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 54 27 100 0
Hartford/Springfield 0 100 100 96 100 100 100 0 27 100 0
Houston, TX 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 27 100 85
Indianapolis, IN 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 73 27 100 58
Jacksonville, FL 0 100 100 77 100 100 100 81 27 100 81
Kansas City, KS 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 62 27 100 35
Knoxville 0 100 100 100 100 81 100 58 27 100 46
Little Rock, AR 0 100 100 100 100 85 65 0 0 73 0
Los Angeles, CA 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 27 100 100
Louisville, KY 0 100 100 35 100 100 100 92 27 100 77
Memphis, TN 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 54 4 100 4
Miami/Ft Lauderdale 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 81 27 100 81
Milwaukee, WI 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 81 27 100 62
Minneapolis/St Paul 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 69 27 100 35
Mississippi 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 19 100 0
Nashville, TN 0 100 100 100 100 65 100 27 27 100 0
New England 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 27 100 0
New Orleans/Mobile 0 100 100 81 100 100 100 0 27 100 0
New York 4 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 27 100 92
Oklahoma City, OK 0 85 100 0 100 100 100 0 27 27 0
Omaha, NE 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 50 27 100 12
Orlando, FL 0 100 100 88 100 100 100 88 27 100 81
Peoria/Springfield 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 81 27 100 50
Philadelphia, PA 0 100 100 100 100 96 100 100 27 100 81
Phoenix/Tucson 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 27 100 58
Pittsburgh, PA 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 42 0 100 0
Portland, OR 0 100 100 46 100 100 100 81 27 100 31
Providence, RI 0 100 100 88 100 100 100 0 27 100 0
Raleigh/Greensboro 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 77 27 100 85
Richmond/Norfolk 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 81 27 100 0
Roanoke, VA 0 100 100 100 100 54 100 46 27 100 46
Sacramento, CA 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 27 100 88
Salt Lake City, UT 0 100 100 62 100 100 100 65 27 100 46
San Ant/Corpus Chr 0 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 27 100 92
San Diego, CA 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 27 100 85
San Fran/Oakland 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 27 100 77
Seattle/Tacoma 0 100 100 0 100 100 100 85 27 100 38
South Carolina 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 77 27 100 50
Spokane, WA 0 100 100 0 100 100 100 81 27 100 54
St. Louis, MO 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 88 27 100 42
Syracuse, NY 0 100 100 85 100 100 100 54 27 100 0
Tampa/St Petersburg 0 100 100 96 100 100 100 85 27 100 85
Toledo 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 85 27 100 65
Tulsa, OK 0 85 100 0 100 100 100 0 27 69 0
West Tex/New Mex 0 100 100 73 100 100 100 100 27 100 92
Wichita, KS 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 31 23 100 19
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Table 4: Market Share of Breyers and Dreyers Flavors
Conditional on Offering
% of
Market
Months
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Offered
Breyers
Extra Creamy Vanilla 0.0831 0.0329 0.0054 0.1541 99.30%
French Vanilla 0.1469 0.0322 0.0722 0.2287 100.00%
Homemade Vanilla 0.0344 0.0348 0.0004 0.1508 86.50%
Natural Vanilla 0.3765 0.1046 0.1817 0.5618 100.00%
Vanilla 0.0102 0.0177 0 0.0307 0.40%
Dreyers
Double Vanilla 0.0392 0.0201 0.0004 0.0868 25.20%
French Vanilla 0.0921 0.0383 0.0223 0.1895 99.50%
Natural Vanilla 0.0295 0.0273 0.0018 0.1365 62.00%
Vanilla 0.1176 0.0788 0.0013 0.3026 97.40%
Vanilla Bean 0.1156 0.0541 0.0034 0.2532 98.00%
Vanilla Custard 0.0078 0.0073 0.0001 0.0382 43.40%
flavors capturing high market shares when offered.
Table 5 presents a summary of the market shares and prices for the brands in-
cluded in the demand analysis. Breyers is the clear market leader with an average
market share of 21%, followed by Dreyers with a market share of almost 14%. Tillam-
ook, Turkey Hill and Yarnells have also sizeable shares in their markets, reflecting
their position as strong - albeit small - regional players. The brands vary in their pric-
ing strategies. Breyers and Dreyers occupy the middle ground, while many regional
players have lower (Hood, Pet, Turkey Hill) or higher (Tillamook, Kemps) average
prices.
As mentioned above, the IRI data include measures of units sold and revenue
(with which we calculate average prices) for each UPC in each market. To estimate
the econometric model, we complement these data with information drawn from a
variety of sources. Table 6 outlines the variables, their sources, and the level of
aggregation. For example, the data that we have on individual demographics are
from the 2000 Census - these data vary across geographic markets, but not over time.
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Table 5: Market shares and prices of brands included in
the analysis.*
Market Share Price
average std. dev. average std. dev.
Breyers 0.2118 0.0983 $3.78 $0.49
Dreyers 0.1379 0.0873 $3.43 $0.51
Deans 0.0236 0.0320 $3.64 $0.74
Friendly 0.0838 0.0724 $3.46 $0.62
Hiland 0.0563 0.0907 $3.53 $0.54
Hood 0.0898 0.1052 $2.80 $0.51
Kemps 0.0365 0.1054 $4.01 $1.01
Mayfield 0.0812 0.1080 $3.90 $0.66
Pet 0.0484 0.0562 $3.05 $0.54
Prairie Farms 0.0393 0.0739 $3.25 $0.54
Tillamook 0.1184 0.0491 $4.14 $0.48
Turkey Hill 0.1090 0.1049 $3.16 $0.54
United Dairy 0.0502 0.0513 $3.91 $0.87
Wells Blue Bunny 0.0710 0.1002 $3.69 $0.75
Yarnells 0.1201 0.1458 $3.80 $0.52
*Note: Market shares are with respect to the inside goods only and
conditional on the brand being present in the market. Numbers do
not add to 1 because market shares are conditional and private label
and small brands are not reported.
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We have monthly information on several input cost measures; some (e.g., fuel prices)
also vary across geographic markets while others (e.g., cost of capital represented
by the commercial paper rate) do not. We have calculated the distance from each
geographic market to the nearest production facility for Breyers and Dreyers. These
are the only data that vary across the manufacturers (but are the same in each time
period).
The panels of Table 6 are split based on the way we use these additional variables.
The top section of the table includes market demographics and temperature; we think
that these may be associated with ice cream demand. There may be differences in
input costs as well - the variables in the second panel possibly influence the costs
of manufacturing and/or distributing the product. In the bottom panel, we have
included some statistics on the market structure of complementary industries that
may affect the ice cream market on either the supply or the demand side. Prices
and measured quantities sold in supermarkets may be affected if there are more Wal-
Mart stores in the local market. Since manufacturers rely on distributors that are
specifically equipped to transport frozen dairy products, the market structure of these
distributors may also be relevant.
4 Empirical Strategy
Below we first give details on the specification of our empirical model, which differs
from the model presented in Section 2 by fully accounting for regional and private
label brands in the demand estimation. We thus no longer assume that exactly the
same brands appear in both stages of the game. We then discuss the estimation
procedure in more detail.
4.1 Econometric Specification
We define the potential market size based on the total supermarket sales of regular,
3.5/4 pint ice cream in each market and calculate the shares of the competing brands
relative to this sizeM .11 While we consider only Breyers and Dreyers at the product-
11We tried several alternative definitions for M . In general, definitions based on ice cream con-
sumption, which include non-supermarket ice cream sales (e.g., sales in ice cream parlors and spe-
cialty stores) were too broad to produce reasonable empirical results. Different definitions based on
supermarket sales did, however, yield similar estimates to those reported here.
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Table 6: Summary of Non-IRI Data.
Variable Source Level of Mean Std. Dev.
Variation
Demographic and Demand Variables:
Population 2000 U.S. Census Market 3,164,796 3,044,238
% African American 2000 U.S. Census Market 0.124 0.097
Avg. household size 2000 U.S. Census Market 2.560 0.141
Per capita income 2000 U.S. Census Market 21,831.210 2,917.420
% under 18 2000 U.S. Census Market 0.257 0.019
% 18-24 years 2000 U.S. Census Market 0.098 0.011
% 25-44 years 2000 U.S. Census Market 0.306 0.018
% 45-64 years 2000 U.S. Census Market 0.219 0.013
% over 65 2000 U.S. Census Market 0.121 0.024
% Males 2000 U.S. Census Market 0.489 0.006
Temperature NOAA Market & 67.454 17.245
Month
Measures of Various Input Costs:
Commercial paper rate Datastream Month 2.035 0.951
Cream II ($ per lb) Dairy Market News Month 2.247 0.405
Nonfat dry milk ($ per lb) Dairy Market News Month 0.926 0.092
Sugar (cents per lb) Bloomberg Month 9.039 1.560
Manufacturing wage Bureau of Labor Month 688.407 17.316
(NAICS 3115) Statistics
Fuel Price ($ per gallon) Energy Information Market & 147.471 31.746
Administration Month
Distance from closest Own calculations Market & 283.815 200.063
production facility to Firm
market (Breyers)
Distance from closest Own calculations Market & 321.364 207.822
production facility to Firm
market (Dreyers)
Market Structure - Complementary Industries:
# of Wal-Mart stores Own calculations Market 26.594 17.112
Local distributors (NAICS County Business Market 152,667 56,801
424330) - population per Patterns
establishment
Local distributors (NAICS County Business Market 0.492 0.201
424330) - share of Patterns
employment in top-4 firms
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choice stage, our demand model also includes private labels and regional players. The
utility of these alternatives is specified in the same way as for the branded flavors in
equation (1). We assume that the prices for these alternatives are set in a non-
strategic way, independent of the product offerings or prices of Breyers and Dreyers
and therefore substitute their observed prices in the demand model. Because the
identity of the smaller players changes from market to market, we use a separate
demand model for each market that includes the available flavors in that market.
On the demand side, the observed characteristics of flavor f offered by brand b in
market t, Xbft, include a brand constant, a flavor constant, and the price. We allow for
random coefficients on the price and the brand constants for Breyers and Dreyers.12
For the outside good we include in X00t the market’s monthly average temperature,
monthly dummies and indicators for US regions (Northeast, Midwest, and South), the
market population’s breakdown by gender (%male), age (%18–24, %25–44, %45–64,
and %65 and above), and race (%African American), as well as the average household
size, per capita income, and lastly the number of Wal-Mart stores operating in the
market, capturing one of the primary alternatives to supermarket shopping. This rich
set of demographics that vary city-by-city affects demand for all inside goods relative
to the outside good. Due to the random coefficients, these demographics also affect
the relative market shares of Breyers and Dreyers. Additional factors that explain
differences in the prevalence of Breyers and Dreyers across cities include differences
in flavor offerings across cities and market-specific marginal cost shifters that result
in differences in prices across cities.
On the cost side, as evident from Figure 4, the flavor-specific “flavorings” compo-
nent of total cost is relatively small; thereby justifying our assumption that marginal
costs are constant across flavors offered by a given firm. Further, the primary cost
components - dairy, packaging, and wages - are likely constant within regions and
across manufacturers, consistent with our notion that these costs are common knowl-
edge across players. In our empirical specification, we include as marginal cost shifters
in wbt a brand-specific constant, transportation costs (distance between the mar-
ket and a brand’s closest distribution center, average fuel cost), input prices (sugar,
cream, dry milk, the local average weekly wage, and the commercial paper rate), and
distribution costs (measures of market structure in local distribution: population per
12For comparison purposes, we have also estimated a homogeneous logit demand model. To make
this specification more flexible, we replaced the brand and flavor constants by brand-flavor constants.
27
Wages
"Substitutes"
Other
Flavorings
Packaging
Sugar
Dairy
Figure 4: Breakdown of manufacturing cost in the ice cream industry. 1997 Economic
Census.
local distributor and share of employment in the top 4 local distributors).
The inclusion of the regional players in the demand model results in differences
in variable profit for a particular optional flavor offered by Breyers or Dreyers across
markets. Variable profits depend on marginal cost shifters, demographics, and the
entire set of rivals’ products. Since regional players and their offerings differ across
markets, the differences in the degree of substitution between the regional players’
flavors and those of the national players result in differences in the profitability of a
particular flavor that results in different flavor offering probabilities across markets.
We assume that the flavor-specific fixed offering costs are drawn from a log-normal
distribution with brand-flavor specific scale and shape parameters and a location pa-
rameter of zero, i.e., Gbf = ln(ν¯bf , σ
2
bf ), where ν¯bf and σ
2
bf denote the parameters of
the normal distribution of the log of νbf . We use the log-normal distribution as a
flexible distribution that ensures positive fixed costs and that allows us to compute in
a tractable fashion the distribution of fixed costs when firms offer both flavors and the
fixed costs equal to the sum of the two flavors’ fixed costs. The mean of the distribu-
tion, exp
(
ν¯bf +
1
2
σ2bf
)
, captures all factors that determine product assortment choices
that are not accounted for in the average estimate of variable profits, while its stan-
dard deviation captures deviations from the average decision across markets/months.
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4.2 Estimation
For a given set of parameters for the demand and pricing equations, the second stage
of the model yields predicted market shares for the flavors offered in a given market.
These market share values are then scaled by our estimates of market size M . In
addition, the pricing stage generates estimates of marginal costs that the observed
prices and the assumption of Bertrand-Nash pricing imply.13 These marginal costs
flow into the first-stage profit function to determine profits of all potential assortment
choice combinations. The first stage then focuses on determining an equilibrium
probability of each potential flavor being offered in a given market.
We observe each brand’s actual assortment decisions, d◦bt = (d
◦
b1t, . . . , d
◦
bOBt
), the
actual market share, s◦bft, for all flavors f that are part of the assortment chosen
in the first stage (including both staples and optional flavors), and the price, p◦bt,
charged by the brand for all flavors in the chosen assortment (recall that the price for
a given brand is uniform across flavors). To estimate the parameters of the model,
we match firms’ behavior in terms of these three variables to the model predictions
for these variables using simulated method-of-moments estimators (Hajivassiliou &
McFadden 1998).
The first set of moment conditions matches the expected market shares as defined
in equation (2) to the ones observed in the data. We define market share prediction
errors, denoted by the Fb-dimensional row vector e
s
bt with elements
esbft =
{
{s◦bft − sbft(d◦1t, . . . , d◦Bt)}d◦bft if f = 1, . . . , Ob,
{s◦bft − sbft(d◦1t, . . . , d◦Bt)} if f = Ob + 1, . . . , Fb,
(17)
where predicted market shares are conditional on actual assortment decisions. The
difference between observed and expected market shares is due to sampling error.
Our first set of moment conditions is thus the sum of squared deviations of predicted
from observed market shares:
Q1b(θ) =
∑
t
esbt(e
s
bt)
′.
Second, we exploit the assumption that observed and unobserved components in
13The data for one of the markets, Little Rock, AR, was suspect because Dreyers was not at all
present for a couple of quarters. For this reason we could not back out marginal cost as described,
and we drop this market from the analysis.
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the pricing first-order condition, equation (4), are uncorrelated. We use equation
(4) to back out the unobserved marginal cost contribution, η◦bt, that sets predicted
prices equal to the observed prices for the chosen bundle. We then interact it with
observed marginal cost shifters in a moment condition. Note that we cannot use a
moment condition matching the predicted prices to the actual ones for the estimation
because we already exploit the pricing first-order conditions to back out the cost
shock. We use weights to combine the moment conditions pertaining to brand b into
the least-squares objective:
Q2b(θ) = η
′
bWb(W
′
bWb)
−1W ′bηb,
where ηb is a T × 1 vector of marginal cost shocks for brand b and Wb is a T × K
matrix of the exogenous marginal cost shifters wbt (e.g., manufacturer transportation
cost, price of milk and sugar for brand b). We obtain marginal cost estimates from
minimizing this objective function.
Our third and last set of moment conditions results from matching the firms’
actual assortment choices to the ones predicted by the model. Formally, we define
assortment prediction errors (the difference between the predicted choice probability
and the actual assortment choice), denoted by the 2Ob-dimensional row vector eabt with
elements:
eab·t = 1(d
◦
bt = d
′
bt)− Pr(d′bt) ∀d′bt ∈ {0, 1}Ob , (18)
where 1(·) is the indicator function. We match observed to predicted choice proba-
bilities:
Q3b(θ) =
∑
t
eabt(e
a
bt)
′.
We obtain fixed-cost estimates by minimizing this objective function.
Reflecting the two-stage nature of the game, this last stage of the estimation
takes the demand and marginal cost estimates as inputs. We break up the estimation
problem into smaller pieces. First we obtain the demand parameters. Given the
demand parameters, we estimate the marginal cost coefficients. Finally, with both
demand and marginal cost parameters in hand, we obtain the fixed cost.
To calculate the objective function we draw a large number of fixed costs (S =
5000) and obtain a nonparametric estimate of the frequency with which a firm of-
fers a particular assortment given its beliefs about its rival’s offerings. Because the
30
frequency count can jump even for small changes in the parameter values, the ob-
jective function is discontinuous. Therefore we use a Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm
for the minimization. In addition, we bootstrap standard errors. To this end, we
create a large number (100) artificial data sets of the same size as our original data
set by drawing observations with replacement from our original data set. We then
apply our estimator to each of the artificial data sets. The empirical distribution
of the estimates on the artificial data sets then approximates the distribution of our
estimator.
5 Results
5.1 Monte Carlo Study
We first test the ability of our estimation procedure to recover the fixed costs using
Monte Carlo simulations. We generate 100 replications of a simulated data set of 256
potential markets. We work with a very simple market structure scenario: there are
two competitors and each has the option to offer zero, one, or two flavors. Demand is
homogenous logit and there are brand-flavor fixed effects. The firms are constrained
to charge the same price for both products if they offer both varieties, similar to the
current practice in the ice cream industry. We generate demand and cost shifters in
the form of temperature and manufacturer-specific transportation costs by drawing
from the empirical distribution of these variables in our data.
Given the distribution of the unobservables, the exogenous characteristics, and a
reasonable, fixed set of parameters (listed in Table 7 under “True value”), we calculate
the optimal choices of the operating firms with respect to the products they offer
and the price they charge, as well as the corresponding market share for each offered
product. Then we proceed to estimate the parameters of the model to see if we recover
the true values that generated the predictions. We estimate the fixed-cost parameters
taking demand and marginal cost parameters as given. As evident from Table 7,
even when we start with values that are quite far from the truth (each estimation
run is based on starting values of 0.0001 for all parameters), our procedure yields
average estimates that are very close to the correct values. In unreported results,
we find that our methods-of-moments estimator performs as well as an alternative
maximum-likelihood procedure in recovering the fixed-cost parameters.
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Table 7: Monte Carlo analysis: fixed cost distribution
estimates using simulated data.*
Mean
True Value Est. Value Bias Std. dev. RMSE
Mean
brand 1, flavor 1 0.0100 0.0086 -1.36E-03 6.32E-03 6.47E-03
brand 1, flavor 2 0.0250 0.0220 -2.95E-03 1.65E-02 1.68E-02
brand 2, flavor 1 0.0100 0.0110 1.01E-03 7.14E-03 7.22E-03
brand 2, flavor 2 0.0200 0.0170 -3.05E-03 1.24E-02 1.27E-02
Standard deviation
brand 1, flavor 1 0.1000 0.1061 6.13E-03 4.22E-02 4.26E-02
brand 1, flavor 2 0.2500 0.2758 2.58E-02 1.47E-01 1.49E-01
brand 2, flavor 1 0.1000 0.1052 5.19E-03 4.77E-02 4.80E-02
brand 2, flavor 2 0.2000 0.2133 1.33E-02 9.76E-02 9.85E-02
*Each estimation run is based on starting values of 0.0001 for all parameters.
5.2 Merger Analysis
One compelling reason to model endogenous product choice together with demand is
to generate more accurate merger simulations. As discussed previously, simulations
based on demand models that do not allow for the possibility that a merged firm
might change the composition or characteristics of its post-merger product portfolio
do not necessarily reflect the firm’s optimal behavior. The parameters of our model
permit us to simulate more accurately, as both price and the set of offered products
can be optimally adjusted. To illustrate the impact of this change, we computed
a series of simple merger counterfactuals using the simulated 256 markets described
above. The results of our counterfactual simulation demonstrate the potential pitfalls
that can occur by ignoring endogenous product choice.
To obtain the effects of a merger and to demonstrate the impact of allowing for
product choice in the model, we simulate optimal behavior in three different scenarios.
First is the base duopoly case in which the two firms in question are competitors,
choosing products to offer and then competing on price. We then allow the firms to
merge, acting like a monopolist and potentially offering as many as four products.
We distinguish between three alternatives, constraining the merged firm to offer the
same products that the duopolist did (the current standard in the literature), charge
the same prices as the duopolists for all possible assortments, or allowing it to re-
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optimize in the product-choice stage. As a consequence, the monopolist potentially
chooses a different set of products to offer than in the competitive environment. We
simulate market outcomes under a low and high regime for the fixed costs of offering
the individual flavors as presented in the left and right panels of Table 8.
To compute the statistics presented in Table 8, we use simulation techniques to in-
tegrate over the empirical distribution of flavor fixed costs. For a given draw from the
cost distributions of each of the four flavors, we record the monopolist’s optimal fla-
vor choice given the realizations, together with the optimal price, variable profit, and
total profit of the chosen assortment. We then solve the duopolist’s assortment choice
problem by computing each brand’s expected profit of offering each assortment. As
in the monopoly case, we record the realization of brand-flavor fixed costs, each firm’s
chosen assortment, and the associated optimal prices and profits. For the duopolists’
chosen assortments, we recompute the monopoly prices and profits. Similarly, for
the duopolists’ chosen prices, we recompute the monopolist’s assortment choice. We
repeat this procedure to integrate over the distribution of fixed costs. This allows
us to determine the expected profit and prices of offering each assortment under the
competitive scenarios and, for the monopolist, the empirical frequency with which
each assortment is offered. For each of the 256 markets, we aggregate across assort-
ments to obtain weighted average prices, consumer surplus, and variable and total
profits, using as weights the empirical (in the case of the monopolist) or equilibrium
(in the case of the duopolists) probability with which each assortment is offered.
Table 8 presents a summary of the key market-level outcomes under the scenarios
described above, with all the figures representing the average outcomes across all the
markets. Our “fixed products” merger simulation generates reasonable findings, in
line with other studies using similar methodology. Comparing the first two columns
of each panel, prices and profits are higher for the merged firm than for competing
duopolists, while consumer surplus is lower. By construction, the number of flavors
is the same in each of the first two columns. When no longer constrained, total
industry profits are (necessarily) higher, as the newly merged firm chooses to offer a
different assortment some of the time. In the case presented in Table 8, the resulting
endogenous post-merger product assortment depends critically on the level of the
fixed costs of offering additional flavors. In the low fixed cost regime the merged firm
offers fewer flavors on average either at duopoly or at monopoly prices, while the
merged firm occasionally offers more products in the high fixed cost scenario. Indeed,
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it appears that the reduction in price competition makes it worth spending the higher
fixed cost to offer an additional flavor some of the time. As a consequence, in the
high fixed cost simulation the merger results in both higher total profits and higher
consumer surplus as compared with the duopoly case. Such a finding would not be
possible without endogenizing the product assortment decision, as our methodology
allows.
These simulated merger results also give some idea about magnitudes; in particu-
lar, whether ignoring product assortment endogeneity generates substantial changes
between the results in the second and third columns (as compared with the differences
between the first and second columns). As such, one could interpret the results in
Table 8 as suggesting that ignoring product choice has minimal effect if the fixed-
costs to offering each product are low. However, it is important to recognize that the
example constrains the merged firm to optimize only among the previously offered
flavors. In a case where the merged firm has the entire Hotelling line available to
choose from (as in Gandhi et al. (2008)) or a larger flavor choice set at its disposal,
the impact is likely to be more substantial. Additional market participants may also
re-optimize portfolios post-merger, generating more changes to surplus and profits.
Indeed, the results in any specific case will rely critically on the estimated parame-
ters in the model. Nonetheless, this exercise clearly demonstrates the importance of
endogenizing product choice in the context of a policy simulation.
5.3 Empirical Analysis
Demand and Marginal Cost. Table 9 presents the parameters of the demand
and pricing equations for the ice cream data. As a baseline, we include a homo-
geneous logit model that allows for separate brand-flavor dummies for all offered
flavors (not reported in the table). The second column in Table 9 contains our main
random-coefficients demand specification. The majority of estimated coefficients is
stable across the two specifications. The demand for each flavor falls in the brand’s
price, with an implied elasticity ranging from −2.01 to −1.52 for the homogeneous
logit model and −2.02 to −1.40 for the random-coefficients logit model, which is
comparable to other frequently purchased consumer goods in mature categories.
In addition we control for variables that shift demand for all inside goods relative
to the outside option such as market demographics and time dummies. Our estimates
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Table 8: Merger Simulations.*
Merged Firm
Fixed Fixed Endog.
Duopoly Products Prices Choices
Low fixed cost Price brand 1 4.1707 4.8710 4.7754 4.8317
Price brand 2 3.9295 4.7381 4.5320 4.6685
Total profits brand 1 0.2117 0.4981 0.4862 0.4833
Total profits brand 2 0.2075 0.3266 0.3678 0.3822
Industry total profits 0.4191 0.8247 0.8540 0.8656
Number of flavors 1.8585 1.8585 1.2047 1.4361
Consumer surplus 2.7593 1.2642 1.2060 1.2261
High fixed cost Price brand 1 4.6044 4.7048 4.8011 4.8011
Price brand 2 4.4347 4.4736 4.5245 4.5245
Total profits brand 1 0.0487 0.0488 0.0646 0.0646
Total profits brand 2 0.0818 0.0819 0.0790 0.0790
Industry total profits 0.1305 0.1307 0.1436 0.1436
Number of flavors 0.4395 0.4395 0.4709 0.4709
Consumer surplus 0.6356 0.6348 0.6766 0.6766
*Both scenarios assume the same demand parameters of β0 = [6.5; 6.0; 5.0; 5.5], βprice = −2.5,
βtemp = 0.1, where [β10 ...β
4
0 ] denotes the four flavor-specific intercepts, and marginal cost parameters
of γ0 = [0.45; 0.30], γdistribution = 0.001, and γsugar = 0.3, where γ10 , β
2
0 denotes brand-specific
intercepts. The low fixed cost scenario assumes the following parameter values for the four flavor
fixed cost distributions: ν¯ = [0.35, 0.3, 0.09, 0.12] and σ = [0.16, 0.16, 0.16, 0.16], while the high fixed
scenario is based on ν¯ = [1.44; 1.20; 1.00; 1.12] and σ = [0.16; 0.16; 0.16; 0.16].
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indicate that there is statistically significant seasonal and geographic variation in the
demand for vanilla flavors in supermarkets. In addition, the demographic composition
of a market has a pronounced impact on demand: Markets with a higher percentage
of males and African Americans tend to have higher demand for vanilla ice cream
(lower demand for the outside good).
Most aggregate marginal cost shifters, such as the price of sugar and dry milk,
are not statistically significant, possibly due to the lack of variation across markets
and brands. As expected, marginal costs increase in brand-specific transportation
(distance to the nearest distribution facility) and fuel costs, as well as the proxies for
the size and density of the local distribution network.
Fixed Cost. Reasonable starting values for the flavor fixed cost distributions should
reflect variation in actual fixed costs. To determine the likely magnitude for these
costs, we use the following procedure. Beginning with initial estimates for demand
and marginal cost, we calculate variable profits for each possible offering. We then
loop through flavors and use data on whether the flavor is offered to infer bounds on
fixed costs that would make the observed flavor offering decision optimal.
Take for example Breyers Homemade Vanilla. Assume first that it, together with
Breyers Natural Vanilla, is part of Breyers’ actual flavor offering. We then consider the
hypothetical offering that removes Homemade Vanilla, holding fixed the availability
of all other flavors. Because of our assumption of cost additivity, the fixed costs of the
actual offering equal those of the hypothetical offering plus the fixed cost of offering
Homemade Vanilla. Since Breyers did not choose this hypothetical offering, the fixed
offering cost for Homemade Vanilla must be smaller than the difference in variable
profits between the actual and the hypothetical offering. This gives us an upper
bound on the fixed cost draw for Homemade Vanilla. More formally, for Homemade
Vanilla to not be chosen, it must be true that:
ΠBreyers(HV,NV )− νHV − νNV ≥ ΠBreyers(NV )− νNV
⇔ νHV ≤ ΠBreyers(HV,NV )− ΠBreyers(NV ),
therefore ΠBreyers(HV,NV )−ΠBreyers(NV ) yields an upper bound for the fixed costs.
Conversely, if Homemade Vanilla is not offered, we consider adding it to the actually
chosen offering, which allows us to derive a lower bound on the fixed cost draw in a
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Table 9: Demand and marginal cost estimates using ice cream data.
Homogeneous Logit Random Coefficients
Model Logit Model
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Demand – Inside flavors
Price -0.5019 0.0209 -0.5070 0.0264
Price SD 0.0623 0.0158
Breyers constant 0.7958 0.1853
Breyers SD 0.1081 0.0813
Dreyers constant -0.5733 0.1791
Dreyers SD 0.1455 0.1280
Demand – Outside option
Temperature 0.0009 0.0011 0.0087 0.0018
January dummy -0.0080 0.0448 0.0048 0.0088
February dummy 0.0880 0.0384 0.0544 0.0591
March dummy 0.1193 0.0441 -0.0765 0.0603
April dummy 0.0762 0.0448 -0.2425 0.0466
May dummy 0.1198 0.0496 -0.2559 0.0608
June dummy 0.1121 0.0560 -0.3904 0.0643
July dummy 0.1134 0.0545 -0.4421 0.0674
August dummy 0.1306 0.0641 -0.2518 0.0719
September dummy 0.0745 0.0580 -0.3650 0.0666
October dummy 0.0689 0.0479 -0.1748 0.0546
November dummy -0.0747 0.0453 -0.0227 0.0363
Northeast dummy 0.6097 0.0449 -0.5940 0.0483
Midwest dummy 0.3090 0.0365 -0.4844 0.0371
South dummy 0.4451 0.0418 -0.4895 0.0505
% African American -1.1401 0.1566 -0.1863 0.1614
% Male -9.6801 1.7030 -21.3949 0.5949
% 18-24 old -4.4395 1.4749 1.6635 1.5779
% 25-44 old -3.7634 1.5196 -3.6254 1.2495
% 45-64 old -2.9410 1.3352 -2.2134 1.3165
% 65 and older -8.0026 0.9295 -1.7608 0.8625
Average household size 0.2340 0.1461 -0.7608 0.0955
Per capita income -0.0001 1.1E-05 0.0001 6.7E-06
Wal-Mart 0.0015 0.0007 -0.0041 0.0009
Marginal cost:
Breyers constant 5.2320 0.9258 4.5881 0.9104
Dreyers constant 4.8952 0.9254 4.2710 0.9099
Transportation cost 0.0002 3.2E-05 0.0002 3.2E-05
Sugar price -0.0027 0.0252 -0.0057 0.0244
Wage -0.0037 0.0014 -0.0040 0.0013
Commercial paper -0.0108 0.0600 -0.0035 0.0587
Cream II price -0.1180 0.0512 -0.1180 0.0503
Dry milk price -0.2712 0.2043 -0.2916 0.2031
Distributor employment 0.4236 0.0584 0.4578 0.0583
Population per distributor -2.0E-06 1.8E-07 -2.0E-06 1.8E-07
Fuel cost 0.0029 0.0007 0.0031 0.0007
Brand-flavor constants (homogeneous logit) and majority of brand and all
flavor constants (random coefficients logit) omitted for brevity.
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Figure 5: Fixed cost bounds obtained from demand and marginal cost estimates.
similar fashion. Repeating this procedure for all flavors and all markets results in a
number of bounds.
In Figure 5 we use box plots to graphically represent the distribution of the so-
obtained lower and upper bounds for the fixed cost of the optional flavors. The
boxes have lines at the lower quartile, median, and upper quartile values. The lines
extending from each end of the boxes capture the entire range of the data. Outliers
are represented by pluses. As evident, the upper bounds tend to be higher than the
lower bounds. Vanilla Custard seems to have lower fixed cost than the other flavors.
There is large variation for both the lower and upper bound of the fixed costs. For
example, the lower bound for Breyer’s Homemade Vanilla ranges from 53 to 16,753
and the upper bound from 62 to 41,707.
We use the bounds to generate starting values for the fixed cost distributions as
follows: we take the average of the mean lower and upper bounds as a guess at the
mean of that flavor’s lognormal fixed cost distribution. Similarly, we take the average
of the standard deviation of the lower and upper bounds as a guess at its standard
deviation. Since we estimate the mean and standard deviation of the underlying
normal distribution, we back out the ν¯bf and σbf associated with these two parameters
of the lognormal distribution and use them as starting values in estimation.
Table 10 presents estimates of the distribution parameters of the underlying nor-
mal distribution of the log of fixed costs using the random-coefficients logit demand
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Table 10: Distribution parameters of log fixed cost es-
timated from ice cream data. Normal distribution.
Random-coefficients demand model.
Parameter Estimate Std.
Error*
Confidence Interval*
Mean ν¯bf
Breyers Homemade Vanilla 5.5397 0.2555 4.9245 6.0253
Dreyers Natural Vanilla 8.3850 0.1221 8.1301 8.6555
Dreyers Vanilla Custard 5.0629 0.1223 4.8732 5.3448
Standard deviation σbf
Breyers Homemade Vanilla 2.1791 0.2495 1.7400 2.7197
Dreyers Natural Vanilla 1.9015 0.1495 1.5468 2.1735
Dreyers Vanilla Custard 2.1672 0.1689 1.9886 2.5601
*Bootstrapped standard errors and confidence intervals based on 100 bootstrap replications.
Table 11: Implied means, standard deviations, and me-
dians of estimated fixed costs. Random-coefficients de-
mand model.
Parameter Estimate Confidence Interval*
Mean
Breyers Homemade Vanilla 3340.9 1759.8 6353.6
Dreyers Natural Vanilla 28447.0 15959.2 46020.1
Dreyers Vanilla Custard 2302.1 1103.1 4844.8
Standard deviation
Breyers Homemade Vanilla 83533.0 8510.6 256505.2
Dreyers Natural Vanilla 188332.6 54739.4 407440.3
Dreyers Vanilla Custard 44679.3 7990.0 107313.2
Median
Breyers Homemade Vanilla 252.2 137.6 413.7
Dreyers Natural Vanilla 4653.4 3395.3 5741.7
Dreyers Vanilla Custard 167.2 130.7 209.5
*Bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 100 bootstrap replications.
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model, while Table 11 contains the associated mean, standard deviation, and median
for the level of fixed costs for each of the three optional flavors we consider in estima-
tion, Breyers Homemade Vanilla and Dreyers Natural Vanilla and Vanilla Custard.
Given the assumed log-normal distribution of fixed costs, the median level of fixed
costs may be the most informative summary measure. As a check on their magnitudes,
we compare the average fixed costs to the variable profits implied by the demand
and marginal cost parameters presented in Table 9. The variable profits for each of
the three optional flavors amount to $5,961.78 (standard deviation of $5,792.69) for
Breyers Homemade Vanilla, $14,903.37 (standard deviation of $14,792.72) for Dreyers
Natural Vanilla, $288.09 (standard deviation of $279.81) for Dreyers Vanilla Custard.
They are comparable to the estimated fixed costs, suggesting that our fixed costs
estimates are reasonable, as their value would translate into frequent, though not
universal, offering of the three flavors in question.
Recall from Figure 5 that the bounds on fixed costs that we obtain from the
data (and our estimates of demand and marginal cost parameters) are extremely
noisy. These bounds use the fact that, in equilibrium, no unilateral deviation from
the observed offering to an alternative offering can be profitable. Hence, the bounds
exploit only a necessary condition for equilibrium. Our structural model makes use
of the full force of equilibrium to narrow these bounds to obtain point estimates of
the parameters of the fixed cost distribution. The estimates generally lie within the
bounds. At the same time, the large variation in the bounds is reflected in the large
variance of the implied fixed cost distribution.
This large variance is at least partly explained by the role the fixed costs play in
our econometric model. Fixed costs close the model from an econometric perspective
while our pricing and demand analysis determines the variable profit in each market
and period based on the demographic characteristics, marginal cost shifters, and
competition. The fixed-cost estimates rationalize the combination of the pricing and
product choice (availability) decisions observed in the data. As such, the estimates
could more broadly be considered measures of unobservable, non-demand or marginal
cost factors determining product availability. However, in our application we feel that
interpreting them as fixed costs makes the most economic sense.
Figure 6 shows how the flavor offerings change with the fixed costs. We plot
changes in the optimal product portfolio offered by Breyers and Dreyers in response
to uniform increases in the level of fixed costs across flavors. η is a scale factor that
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multiplies fixed costs across flavors, where the baseline fixed costs result from setting
η equal to one. In the case of Dreyers, the figure illustrates differential effects of higher
flavor fixed costs on bundle offerings, with the probabilities of offering only one of the
optional flavors or not offering any optional flavor initially gaining steadily in fixed
cost at the expense of the option of offering both flavors. For higher levels of fixed
cost, however, the single-flavor options hold relatively steady assortment shares, while
the option of offering neither of the two flavors continues to grow in likelihood. This
finding suggests that the two flavors substitute for each other, such that with high
fixed cost, demand is not sufficient to offer both, but more than outweighs the fixed
cost of offering only one of the two flavors. We investigate the role of differentiation
between optional flavors in greater detail in the next section.
With knowledge of the fixed cost estimates, one can conduct an analysis to com-
pute the sort of endogenous product assortment merger effects that we show in the
simulations to have important policy implications. Such a merger analysis is compli-
cated in our case since the brands offer a number of overlapping staple flavors that
we abstract from in the stylized merger analysis above. We instead use the estimated
fixed cost parameters to investigate linkages between preferences and firms’ pricing
decisions on the one hand and product assortment decisions on the other to illus-
trate the benefits of incorporating a more fully specified demand side into a product
assortment model.
5.4 Policy Experiments
We demonstrate the economic significance of the estimated structural parameters in
several illustrative analyses. We consider how assortment depends on consumers’
taste for variety and quality. To highlight the importance of product differentiation,
we look at the effect of varying the degree of horizontal differentiation and the degree
of vertical differentiation (or brand preferences) on assortment choices.
Horizontal differentiation. Given the logit specification for consumer demand
in equation (1), we can investigate the role of horizontal preference heterogeneity
by varying the logit scale parameter, σ (Anderson, de Palma & Thisse 1992). In
estimation, we normalize σ to one. In a counterfactual, we compute how market
shares, mark-ups, and ultimately assortment choices respond to changes in σ (or
equivalently, to rescaling all demand estimates). Formally, we rewrite equation (1)
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as:
Ubfkt = Xbftβk − αkpbt + σ²bfkt. (19)
Figure 7 shows how the likelihood that the two brands offer each of their op-
tional flavors changes as we increase the scale parameter from zero to above two.
We derive the predicted probabilities by using the estimated random-coefficients de-
mand, marginal cost, and fixed cost parameters from Tables 9 and 10, adjusting the
estimated demand-side parameters by σ, as in equation (19). The optional flavor
assortment choice for Breyers is simply offering its optional flavor Homemade Vanilla
versus not, while Dreyers chooses between offering both of its optional flavors, offering
only Natural Vanilla or only Vanilla Custard, or offering neither.
The figure illustrates that as the heterogeneity in consumer tastes increases, both
Breyers (panel 1) and Dreyers (panel 2) are more likely to increase the number of
flavors they offer. With increased horizontal differentiation, even small “pockets” of
demand become more valuable, thus giving firms an incentive to crowd the product
space. Dreyers, for example, is more aggressive in offering Natural Vanilla than
Vanilla Custard alone for low to intermediate degrees of product differentiation. This
reflects that while Natural Vanilla has a higher estimated average fixed cost than
Vanilla Custard, it also has a higher estimated flavor preference, making it on average
more attractive to consumers than Vanilla Custard. As horizontal differentiation
increases, Vanilla Custard becomes the most frequently offered stand-alone product
since its flavor preference and thus profitability are amplified, now balancing its fixed
costs. Most frequently, however, with a sufficiently high degree of horizontal product
differentiation, both flavors make up Dreyers’ optimal portfolio.
Vertical differentiation. Next we turn to the role of vertical differentiation be-
tween the two brands in driving assortment choices. We consider the effect on each
brand’s assortment of increasing the dispersion in the flavor constants for each brand’s
set of optional and staple vanilla flavors included in the demand system. We vary
the degree of vertical differentiation between each brand’s flavors by decomposing the
contribution of the brand and flavor constants into the mean brand effect βb + β¯b.
(9.83 for Breyers and 5.60 for Dreyers) and deviations from the mean, where βb de-
notes the estimated brand constant and β¯b. denotes the mean flavor constant. Thus,
β′bf = λb(βbf − β¯b.)+ β¯b.+βb. Our model estimates above are based on a specification
where λb = 1. We vary the dispersion in brand-flavor constants by increasing λb from
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zero, equivalent to there being no vertical differentiation between the brand’s flavors,
to a value of ten, which corresponds to significantly more vertical differentiation than
in our estimates. In particular, if a given flavor dummy is estimated to be above
(below) average for the brand, then it becomes more (less) attractive for λb > 1.
By construction, we leave the average preference for the brand, and therefore the
attractiveness of the brand’s entire portfolio, unchanged.
As above, we use the estimated random-coefficient demand, marginal, and fixed
cost parameters, together with varying values for λb, to trace out how the product
assortment of each brand changes as the degree of vertical differentiation in its flavors
changes. Figure 8 illustrates the changing assortment choices that increasing vertical
differentiation in its own flavors has on Breyers’ own assortment choices, as well as
the competitive effect that such a change has on Dreyers’ assortment choice.
In the case of Breyers, the estimated brand and flavor effects for the optional flavor
that we consider in the product choice stage (Homemade Vanilla) are below Breyer’s
average of 9.83, with a value of 8.52. The vertical preferences for the flavor thus
falls as we increase the degree of vertical differentiation in the product line (λBreyers).
Panel 1 in Figure 8 illustrates that in response Breyers is increasingly likely not to
offer the flavor, an effect that is magnified by the fixed costs that Breyers pays for
offering the flavor (which is normalized to zero for all other flavors). The probability
that Homemade Vanilla is offered decreases monotonically.
The bottom panel in Figure 8 shows that there is also a competitive effect of the
varying degree of vertical product differentiation for Breyers on Dreyers’ assortment
choices. As the degree of vertical product differentiation rises, it puts downward
pressure on the single price that Breyers charges for all its flavors. Since in the
Bertrand pricing game, prices are strategic complements, Dreyers’ price declines as
well. The associated decline in variable profit implies that Dreyers can no longer cover
the fixed cost of offering its optional flavors, so that the likelihood of offering the full
assortment of optional flavors declines monotonically in λBreyers. The probabilities
that Natural Vanilla or Vanilla Custard are offered on their own do not respond
significantly to increases in Breyers’ vertical differentiation, suggesting that as the full
assortment is slowly removed from the market, some of the demand for the removed
flavor is redirected to the remaining optional flavor.
43
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a framework for incorporating endogenous product choice
in a supply-and-demand model of competition in a differentiated product market.
The empirical model generates estimates of the fixed costs associated with offering
particular products in addition to the typical demand and marginal cost parameters.
With these estimates in hand the researcher is better able to conduct counter-
factual experiments by allowing competitors to change their product offerings opti-
mally as part of the exercise. We demonstrate the impact of endogenizing product-
assortment decisions in the context of a merger simulation, in which the merged
firms often choose a different set of products than those previously offered, generat-
ing higher profits. The impact of abstracting from endogenous product choice may or
may not be large, depending on the estimated cost and demand parameters. What
is clear though, is that sometimes we reach fundamentally different conclusions by
modeling joint product assortment and pricing decisions. For example, a reduction
in the number of competitors due to a merger may benefit consumers by leading to
increased product variety. The gain accruing to consumers due to the availability
of more products may offset the higher prices due to reduced competition. Hence a
merger may be unambiguously welfare enhancing contrary to the inferences based on
the commonly used methodology.
Unlike reduced-form approaches used in the entry literature, by explicitly model-
ing price competition we can show how demand-side factors affect product-assortment
decisions. In particular, we investigate the effect of both horizontal and vertical dif-
ferentiation on equilibrium assortments and prices. With increased horizontal differ-
entiation, even small consumer segments can become valuable enough to give firms
an incentive to crowd the product space. The effect of a change in vertical product
differentiation is more subtle and depends on how exactly consumers value the various
products alternatives that a firm may consider offering. There is no doubt, however,
that product assortment decisions are not made in a competitive vacuum: As our
empirical findings indicate, when a rival’s products become more differentiated, the
price level in the market may fall and the firm may be inclined to cull the variety
offered since variable profits no longer can cover fixed costs.
In sum, deriving the variable profits that enter the product-choice decision from
a structural model of product-market competition is a big step forward from the
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reduced-form profit functions typically used in the entry and location choice litera-
ture. Given the importance of price in consumer purchase decisions, this is a critical
element when attempting to model product assortment decisions. In addition, relative
to the literature on structural demand models, our results show that incorporating
endogenous product choice is essential for policy simulations and may entail very
different conclusions from settings where product assortment choices are held fixed.
Our game-theoretic model abstracts from a number of complicating factors for
the sake of empirical tractability. While our two-stage game partially captures the
relative irreversibility of assortment decisions, ideally the model would reflect the
different periodicity of the pricing and product choice decisions. One may also want to
allow for serial correlation in firms’ assortment decisions over time. Short of specifying
and estimating a fully dynamic model, one could possibly introduce state-dependence
into the model, thus allowing the distribution of fixed costs to differ systematically
depending on whether the product has been offered in the previous period.
While our results indicate that deriving the variable profits from a structural model
of product-market competition is critical to modeling product assortment decisions, it
has a cost: We abstract from unobserved product characteristics that would introduce
selection effects into the assortment and pricing decisions, which would significantly
limit our ability to use information on demand and prices for offered products to infer
the profitability of those products that the firms chose not to offer. Formulating a
model that confronts this issue and developing an econometric method to deal with
the ensuing endogeneity bias in the demand estimation is of critical importance for
future work.
Another venue to pursue is to relax the restriction that firms select among a
prescribed set of already developed alternatives. The initial product development de-
cision would be very interesting to analyze, and allowing firms greater choice among
product characteristics would certainly increase the value and importance of incorpo-
rating product selection. In addition, addressing dynamic new product development
as part of the analysis is a promising area for future research.
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Figure 6: Assortment probabilities as a function of level of fixed costs.
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Figure 7: Assortment probabilities as a function of degree of horizontal differentiation.
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Figure 8: Assortment probabilities as a function of Breyers’ degree of vertical differ-
entiation.
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